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Modern diplomacy, as embodied by its most essential institution—the maintenance of 
plenipotentiary ambassadors in foreign capitals—has existed for about five hundred years. The 
idea that sovereign states could improve their chances of survival by combining together in a 
federal association is almost as old. It first appeared in a work entitled Le noueau Cynée (1623) 
by the French monk Émeric Crucé.[1] In common with earlier humanist writers like Desiderius 
Erasmus and Thomas More, Crucé believed that the prevalence of war in human affairs was a 
reflection of wickedness and stupidity. Its remedy, however, lay not in a transformation of human 
nature, but in reform of the international system. The surest way for states to restrain their natural 
propensity for conflict was to submit their disputes to a permanent international assembly, 
comprised of representatives of the great potentates of Europe, Asia, and Africa; which assembly 
would possess the collective wisdom to do justice, and the collective strength to enforce 
agreements. The resulting decline in international violence would in turn reduce the prestige of 
entrenched warrior elites, and encourage the rise of social groups dedicated to pacific pursuits 
like commerce and agriculture. Of these Crucé judged the most important to be international 
trade, whose free exercise was constitutive of, and dependent on, the maintenance of peace. As 
for the hard men of war, he believed they would find their place as members of professional 
armies designed to suppress pirates, "savages," and other renegades who threatened the 
system. 
 
Crucé's work fell on stony soil, and was soon forgotten, though his hope that free trade might 
encourage international harmony would find an echo, a century and a half later, in the works of 
early capitalist theorists like François Quesnay and Adam Smith. They and their followers argued 
that, as markets expanded to encompass more of mankind, the hidden hand that insured their 
efficient and peaceful operation would embrace the realm of politics as well. Political practitioners, 
however, were fully persuaded that war could be a paying proposition, at least for the winners; 
while political theorists, whose main concern was to define the source and boundaries of state 
power, tended to follow the lead of Crucé's great contemporaries, Hugo Grotius and Thomas 
Hobbes, who regarded war as a necessary evil that might be moderated or rendered more 
efficient, but could scarcely be dispensed with. Even those who favored peace and liberty as the 
ultimate ends of politics agreed that these values counted for little in the state of nature, the 
notional space where all sovereignties were imagined to reside. Although schemes for perpetual 
peace based on universal arbitration continued to appear from time to time, they remained 
curiosities. 
 
The idea of a great international federation moved from the realm of abstract utopianism to that of 
practical politics because of its forcible advocacy by the United States. That advocacy, needless 
to say, has been disconcertingly inconstant. The United States intervened in the First World War 
after its president, Woodrow Wilson, had concluded that traditional international practices could 
not insure against a recurrence of war on a scale of destructiveness that dwarfed the political 
objectives of the belligerents. Having successfully lobbied his reluctant allies for the creation of a 
League of Nations, however, Wilson bungled the ratification process back home. America and the 
League drifted apart, and Americans were left to glare disapprovingly from the sidelines as their 
erstwhile partners grappled with the rise of fascism in Europe and Asia. 
 
Yet the call to international engagement was not silenced, above all in the Democratic Party, 
which included ratification of the League charter in its platform throughout the 1920s. Its 
standard-bearer in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt, had been part of the American delegation at 
Versailles, and came away convinced of the League's necessity. Roosevelt interpreted the 
failures of the League in the 1930s as a sign not that collective security was hopeless, but that a 
more robust system of enforcement was required. While accepting that the legitimacy of any 
international organization depended on the sovereign equality of its membership, he also 
recognized that, as a practical matter, only the Great Powers could keep the peace. In the 1940s 
German and Japanese aggression overwhelmed the temperamental and ideological barriers that 
had kept those Powers apart, and Roosevelt was determined that they should remain together 
afterwards, as the guarantors and "policemen" of a new world order. A strong system of post-war 
collective security was an explicit American aim even before the United States entered the war, 
and its appeal to American opinion was enormous. As Stephen Schlesinger observes in his new 
book, Act of Creation, polling in the spring of 1945 revealed that eighty per cent of Americans 
supported the establishment of the United Nations (67), a much higher percentage than had 
favored going to war in the first place.[2] 
 
Roosevelt believed that founding the U.N. would be his greatest achievement. He did not live to 
accomplish it. His death on April 12, 1945, is the starting point for Schlesinger's book, which tells 
the story of the conference convened in San Francisco thirteen days later, where delegates from 
forty-six nations came together to draft and sign the U.N. Charter. It is a circumstantial account, 
surprisingly gripping considering that its subject is, in essence, two months of meetings and 
memoranda. Schlesinger leavens his mass of evidence by paying close attention to the 
personalities of his protagonists, whose "unusual intellect and honest idealism" (xviii) he admires. 
Among these the spotlight falls most consistently on the head of the American delegation, 
Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, who served as the conference president. Stettinius, a 
wealthy business executive with limited international experience, was generally held in scant 
regard by his contemporaries, but here he receives appropriately high marks for his skillful 
handling of the conference's day-to-day proceedings, and for his management of the competing 
pressures to which the American delegation was subject. Schlesinger's book lacks the analytic 
edge of Robert Hilderbrand's study of the Dumbarton Oaks conference of 1944,[3] where the 
basic outlines of the United Nations' organization were hammered out among representatives of 
the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. It offers instead a strong sense of 
how much contingency and uncertainty attended the final steps toward the UN's creation. San 
Francisco was a place where a lot could still go wrong, and for the most part didn't, owing to the 
good judgment and dedication of the people who were there. 
 
The San Francisco conference convened in the shadow of two wars, the World War then in its 
final throes, and the Cold War, whose early auspices haunt Schlesinger's tale. Roosevelt had 
forced the pace of post-war planning, because he believed that once the guns fell silent the 
competing national objectives of the victors would reassert themselves, as they had at Versailles 
a quarter-century before. By the spring of 1945, however, the end was already sufficiently in sight 
that the attention of the winners had begun to turn toward how best to claim their shares of the 
fruits of victory. 
 
For the Soviets this meant first of all the elimination of any possible threat from a restored 
Germany. American planners accepted the justice of this, but assumed that Soviet anxiety could 
be sufficiently assuaged by the exclusive presence of small, militarily insignificant states along the 
Soviets' western frontier, backed by an explicit mechanism of Great Power oversight in which the 
U.S.S.R. would have a decisive say. They were mistaken. The Soviet effort to establish a system 
of indirect rule in Eastern Europe was well underway by the time the San Francisco conference 
began, and it cast a pall over the proceedings, by heightening American suspicions of their most 
important negotiating partner, and by opening the American delegation to charges that any 
concession to Soviet wishes amounted to appeasement—as was said, for instance, of the 
decision to allow the Soviet Union two additional seats in the General Assembly (for Ukraine and 
Belarus), in order to balance America's preponderant influence in Latin America. 
 
Next to managing relations with the Soviets, the greatest challenge facing Stetinnius and his 
colleagues was to insure that the results of the conference would be acceptable to the United 
States Congress, where suspicion of any arrangement prejudicial to American sovereignty ran 
high. The League had been doubly damned in American eyes, for lacking adequate enforcement 
powers, and for lacking any means by which the United States (had it been a member) could 
have opted out of military obligations imposed against its will. The means by which this circle was 
to be squared was the U.N. Security Council, which would have the authority to enforce whatever 
measures it deemed necessary to keep the peace, while affording the Great Powers, who would 
be Permanent Members,[4] the right to veto any action of which they disapproved. 
 
On this matter Soviet and American interests converged, up to a point: neither was prepared to 
be bound by any majority of which it was not a part. The Soviets, however, wanted to extend the 
veto to include questions of "procedure," which would have given Permanent Members the right 
to prevent any questions they found awkward from even being discussed. This the Americans 
could not swallow. Nor could the representatives of the forty-odd smaller states also present in 
San Francisco, who were aware that they were being asked to accept second-class status in the 
new organization, and declined the Soviet offer of a muzzle. It was on this question that the 
conference came closest to failure, only to be saved by Stalin himself, who told his 
representative, Vyacheslav Molotov, to accept the American plan for a more limited veto, since 
the issue was "insignificant" (217). 
 
Reading Schlesinger's account of Stalin slicing through the Gordian Knot of the San Francisco 
conference, one cannot but feel the cold breath of Realpolitik on the back of one's neck. Stalin 
regarded the San Francisco negotiations as one element in a comprehensive settlement with the 
United States, the success of which, from his point of view, would require American acceptance 
of an extensive Soviet sphere of influence in Eurasia, and the effective neutralization of Central 
(and perhaps Western) Europe. Failure to reach agreement on this larger question did indeed 
render the details of the U.N.'s organization insignificant, and it is difficult in retrospect to see how 
this could have been avoided.  
 
The Cold War consigned the U.N. to the realm of "soft power," from which it has lately struggled 
to emerge, in order to confront the myriad threats to peace and order that fifty years of East-West 
confrontation left unaddressed. It has been a dispiriting spectacle. As originally constituted, the 
United Nations is ill-adapted to our present moment, whose requirements were, to say the least, 
unanticipated at San Francisco. Its Charter enshrines the sovereignty of its members as the 
preeminent value of global politics and envisions no legitimate use of military force apart from the 
defense of one state against attack by another. Moving beyond this stale consensus toward one 
better able to contend with terrorism, genocide, nuclear proliferation, and egregious misrule, is 
now the central challenge of international relations, and one on which the struggle to create the 
U.N. casts some useful light. Collective security, as Schlesinger demonstrates, must embrace 
democratic values to the extent that it can, and may even encourage democratic reform, but it is 
not a democratic process in itself. It depends, rather, on the mutual trust and confidence of the 
relatively small number of advanced societies that are strong enough and rich enough to play the 
kind of constabulary role that Roosevelt, and for that matter Crucé, envisioned for them. For 
nearly a century, leadership for this kind of revolutionary re-invention has come overwhelming 
from the United States, and it is for this reason that America's current disillusionment with the 
possibilities of collective security, and the collapse of its foreign policy into unilateralism and 
preventive war, pose such grave risks for the future. It is because of the United States that 
remorseless anarchy is no longer an absolute given of international politics. This is a 
considerable achievement, and one that should not lightly be thrown away. 
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